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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Has the Defendant/Appellant overcome the presumption of 
validity of the trial court's decision not to modify the child 
support award in the original Decree of Divorce? 
2. Did the trial court's apportionment of the parties' 
property work such a manifest injustice as to constitute an abuse 
of discretion by the trial court? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision modifying a Decree of 
Divorce issued by the Honorable Omer J. Call in The First 
Judicial District in Box Elder County on November 28, 1984. The 
original Decree divorced Respondent Jolene Hatch and Appellant 
Scott Hatch from each other, awarded custody to the Appellant 
during the school year and to Respondent during the summer, 
ordered child support to be paid by Appellant during the summer 
months, divided the parties' property, awarded Respondent alimony 
for one year, and ordered Appellant to pay certain marital debts. 
Each party thereafter sought a modification of the Decree of 
Divorce, and on October 2, 1986, Judge Call issued a Memorandum 
Decision. On October 16, 1986, he issued an Order and Judgment 
addressing the requests for modification, and modifying the 
Decree with the regard to the property division. 
Judge Call's modification order has been appealed by 
Appellant Scott Hatch to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the original Decree of Divorce, Appellant Scott Hatch was 
ordered to pay child support during the three summer months of 
each year when the Respondent has custody. Between the issuance 
of the Decree and the modification hearing, Appellant had failed 
to pay three months of support (T. 63). Appellant also failed to 
make any alimony payments, despite the court's order (T. 108) and 
despite the fact that Appellant earns $1,962.00 gross income per 
month (T. 77). 
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Respondent Jolene Hatch's income has increased since the 
original Decree of Divorce. At the time of the Decree, she was 
earning $654.00 net income per month (Memorandum Decision, 
October 2, 1986, page 2), and by the time of the modification 
hearing she had managed to obtain additional part-time employment 
at minimum wage during the winter months (T. 116). This means 
that during the winter months, Respondent earns approximately 
$160.00 gross per month for her part-time work at Eagles (T. 
115), and $576.00 gross per month for full-time work at King's 
(T. 116, 146 - Respondent's salary from King's is calculated by 
multiplying the minimum wage of $3.35/hour by forty hours per 
week and then by 4.3 weeks). Respondent's total gross income 
during the winter months is therefore approximately $736.00 per 
month. 
During the summer months, Respondent maintains her part-time 
job at Eagles for the $160.00 gross income per month, and has 
also obtained construction work for the days during the summer 
when work is available. Respondent Jolene Hatch estimates that 
her gross monthly income in the summer is approximately $750.00 
(T. 115). Therefore, Respondent's total gross income in the 
summer months is approximately $910.00 per month. This is only 
$256.00 per month more than she was earning at the time of the 
original Decree during the summer and only $82.00 per month more 
than she was earning during the winter. 
It should be noted that the Appellant's brief on page 3 
makes the assumption that Respondent "is still working the same 
amount at Eagles" as she was working at the time of the original 
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Decree. In fact, Respondent is only working ten hours per week 
at Eagles at the same $4.00 per hour (T. 115). The assumption in 
Respondent's brief is not cited to the transcript, and is not 
supported by the evidence. 
* With regard to the property division, in the original Decree 
of Divorce issued in November 1984, Judge Call took into 
consideration some of the damage to the house, and determined the 
amount of equity to be awarded to the Respondent with those 
offsets, among others, in mind (Memorandum Decision, October 2, 
1986, page 3). During the modification hearing, Appellant 
asserted that there was further damage of which he was unaware 
which took place between the couple's separation and the granting 
of the divorce, and which he only discovered after he took 
possession in December 1986 (T. 51). 
Evidence adduced at the modification hearing shows that 
Appellant Scott Hatch was in fact aware of much of the damage 
being done to the house, particularly to the basement, both 
through direct communication with his wife, the Respondent Jolene 
Hatch (T. 133, 135, 136, 137, 220), and indirectly through his 
father (T. 44). The damages to the upstairs portion of the house 
were also known by Appellant, and some of those damages were 
caused by him (T. 121). Although two appraisals prior to the 
issuance of the original Divorce Decree reflected no serious 
damage to the house, evidence also showed that the appraisals had 
been done only from the outside (T. 103). 
Judge Call, in his Memorandum Decision of October 2, 1986 
(page 4), found that the Respondent should be responsible for 
three-fourths of the damage and that the Appellant should be 
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responsible for one-fourth. Judge Call after permitting all the 
testimony on the damage requested by the Appellant (T. 14-25, 
60)/ gleaned out those damages that had not been considered in 
the original Decree and permitted Appellant an offset for them, 
as well as offsets for other items requested by the Appellant 
(Memorandum Decision, October 2, 1986, page 4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the assertion by the Appellant, the trial court 
ruled on the child support issue and ordered that the original 
Divorce Decree ordering the Appellant to pay child support remain 
as entered, and not be modified. The rule of judicial review of 
a decision regarding divorce matters on appeal requires that the 
appellant (1) rebut the presumption of validity of the findings 
and judgment of the trial court, (2) show that the trial court's 
findings of fact are contrary to the clear preponderance of the 
evidence, and (3) prove that the trial court misunderstood or 
misapplied the law to such an extent to result in a substantial 
and prejudicial error abused its discretion to the extent that a 
serious inequity or injustice has resulted. The Appellant in 
this case has not carried this burden and therefore the findings 
and judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed. 
With regard to the apportionment of the parties property, 
the trial court decided to modify the original Divorce Decree 
and allow the Appellant an offset for damage done to the house. 
The Court heard all the evidence that the Appellant requested be 
heard, and the Court made a decision on the basis of that 
evidence. The Appellant has not presented sufficient proof that 
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the trial court's decision works such a manifest injustice as tot 
constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT HAS NOT CARRIED HIS BURDEN OF REBUTTING THE 
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO 
MODIFY THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD IN THE ORIGINAL DECREE. 
Contrary to the assertion by the Appellant that Judge Call 
failed to rule on the child support issue, the Order and Judgment 
contains a paragraph stating the basis on which the Court decided 
not to modify the original child support order, while the Order 
itself states that n[t]he Decree of Divorce in this case shall 
remain as entered, except as specifically modified herein." 
Judgment and Order, October 16, 1987, page 3. Since the only 
things modified in the October 16, 1987 Order are the Appellant's 
offset for damage to the house and other offsets, the trial court 
ruled on the child support issue and decided that it not be 
modified. 
Even if this Court were to find that the trial court 
inadvertently failed to rule on the Appellant's request to modify 
the original child support order, the trial court did state in 
its Memorandum Decision and in its Findings of Fact that there 
had not been a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a 
modification of the child support order. 
In Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court reiterated the rules of judicial review of a 
decision regarding divorce matters on appeal. The Court stated 
that 
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although [a divorce] case is in equity and [the Court 
is] free to review both the law and the facts . . . 
[the Court]^placets] a presumption of validity upon the 
trial court's actions in divorce cases. Thus the 
burden is on the appellant to show error, and [the 
Court] will overturn the trial court's findings of fact 
only if they are contrary to the clear preponderance of 
the evidence . . . [The Court] will overturn the trial 
court's judgment where there has been a misunder-
standing or misapplication of the law resulting in sub-
stantial and prejudicial error or where there has been 
such an abuse of discretion that an inequity or 
injustice has resulted. (Citations omitted) 
The Appellant in this case has not carried the required burden 
and therefore this Court should not disturb the judgment of the 
trial court that the child support order should not me modified. 
If this Court determines that it will review the facts in 
this case to determine whether the trial court's findings are 
contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence, the Court, 
upon reviewing the transcript, will discover that the 
Respondent's income has increased slightly ($256.00 per month in 
the winter months and $82.00 in the summer months), bringing her 
monthly gross income to $736.00 in the winter and $910.00 in the 
summer (Memorandum Decision, October 2, 1986, T. 115, 116, 146). 
The Appellant's monthly income has also increased approximately 
$.83 per hour (Order and Judgment, October 16, 1986, page 2), 
bringing his monthly gross income to $1962.00 (T. 77). 
Respondent's slight increase in income does not constitute a 
substantial change in circumstances. 
Once this Court reviews the evidence, if it deems such a 
review necessary under the Berger rules of appellate review cited 
above, it will be required to determine if there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). Unless this Court finds an abuse of 
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discretion on the part of the trial court, it must affirm the 
trial court's refusal to find any substantial change in circum-
stances of the parties that would warrant the imposition of 
support payments by the Respondent. Id. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OF THE PARTIES' PROPERTY 
DOES NOT WORK SUCH A MANIFEST INJUSTICE AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The standard for review of property apportionment in divorce 
cases was set out in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 
1986), as follows: 
This Court endows the trial court's adjustment of 
financial interests of the parties with a presumption 
of validity and does not review their values absent a 
clear abuse of discretion . . . We do not lightly 
disturb property divisions made by the trial court and 
uphold its decision except where to do so would work a 
manifest injustice or inequity. 
This standard was reiterated most recently in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 
59 UAR 42, 44 (5/29/87), in which this Court stated that n[o]n 
appellate review, that trial court's apportionment of property 
will not be disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice 
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.11 
In Berger v. Berger, supra at 698, the defendant contended 
that certain pieces of real property which were awarded to the 
plaintiff were undervalued. The Utah Supreme Court in that case 
stated that it had examined the valuations and decided to refrain 
from disturbing any of them since they were all based on 
competent evidence. The Court also stated that their value was 
in issue at the trial, and the trial court, within its rightful 
discretion, made the valuation decision it saw fit. 
The trial court in this case, after hearing and considering 
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all the evidence requested by the Appellant, determined that 
Appellant is entitled to a greater offset than was initially 
determined in the original Decree of Divorce. It is the 
Respondent's view that Judge Call was more than fair in hearing 
the evidence and in apportioning the fault for the damage to the 
house. A certain portion of the damage and some of the offsets 
were considered when the original Decree was issued, and the 
remainder thereof were judiciously weighed when the requests for 
modification of the Decree was heard. 
The Appellant has not carried his burden of proving that 
Judge Call abused his discretion or committed substantial and 
prejudicial error that deprived the Appellant of a full and fair 
presentation of his case. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1974). 
Nor has the Appellant proved that the findings of the trial court 
would work a manifest injustice or inequity. In the absence of 
such proof, the findings and judgment of the trial court should 
not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and judgment of the trial court in the 
modification order should be upheld. The Appellant has not 
carried his burden of rebutting the presumption of validity of 
those findings and judgment. After a full and fair hearing, 
Judge Call found that there was not a sufficient change of 
circumstances to warrant imposition of child support payments 
upon the Respondent. He also found that the original Decree of 
Divorce was required to be modified to take into account offsets 
and damage that had not been considered at the original trial. 
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Rather than be seen as an abuse of discretion, the trial court's 
indulgence and careful consideration of the facts should be 
applauded. 
Respondent Jolene Hatch respectfully submits that the 
findings and decision of the trial court b^ affirmed, 
DATED this 1 Y day of July, 
Attorney/for plaintiff/Respondent 
P.O. Box 1T1— 
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Tremonton, Utah 84337 
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